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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
THE JAPANISATION OF SILICON GLEN: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SPIN-OFF AND SUPPLIER LINKAGES 
by James McCalman, Glasgow Business School, 
University of Glasgow 
Introduction There is also a question mark over whether the R&D 
work is linked to product design or is simply 
modrfication to suit local conditions. One of the 
significant issues is that given the R&D propensity 
apparently present in the foreign electronics sector why 
have such firms not generated significant spin-offs or 
localised supplier networks? (3:4) 
The incidence of management buy-outs, subsidiary 
spin-offs and the level of local supplier linkages in the 
Scottish electronics industry has always been both a 
cause for concern and a source of great disappointment. 
For too many years now the cry of wasted opportunity 
has been heard amongst analysts of the Silicon Glen 
phenomenon as the industry itself has spectacularly failed 
in its attempt to become Scottish in an ownership sense. 
The December 1990 issue of this commentary notes that 
in the electronics industry in Scotland, "...the actual 
record of MBOs in this sector is disappointing, with only 
two of any note in the last couple of years."(l) One of 
these was subsequently sold to a Korean company. The 
evidence suggests that the nature of the industry itself has 
prevented the development of a more prominent 
indigenous representation and that the large American 
domination has had a negative influence in generating 
start-ups, developing the immediate local supplier 
infrastructure or leading to a significant growth in 
management buy-outs. 
The Scottish correspondent of the Financial Times wrote 
in 1989 that, "Another disappointment has been the 
failure of the multinationals to breed many offshoots in 
Scotland through the process - well known in the US -
whereby teams of executives spin out to set up on their 
own."(2) What we have is largely what we consciously 
set out to develop: an American-derived industry 
comprising production-oriented subsidiary operations. The 
Locate in Scotland Bureau and the Scottish Development 
Agency's electronics division have managed, since the 
mid-1970s to attract a significant number of American 
electronics companies into the Scottish economy, and the 
subsequent effect on employment has been welcomed. 
Both these agencies would be the first to admit that this 
American base brings limited benefits other than those 
associated with direct employment. The foreign-owned 
sector is predominantly American, and consists of 
subsidiary operations which have, over time, evolved 
limited research and development and marketing 
capabilities. However, the level of this R&D capability is 
confusing. A survey by Young, Hood and Dunlop in 
1988 found that 53 per cent of subsidiaries claimed to 
undertake some significant R&D work and only 15 per 
cent undertook no R&D at all. 
There has, over the last few years, been a change in 
emphasis. Again as the December 1990 issue of this 
commentary notes, "...we may now be seeing some 
success from the SDA's policy of increasingly targeting 
the Far East as a source of inward investment."(5) This 
paper looks at some of the likely implications of 
sustained inward investment in the Scottish electronics 
industry from Japan and looks at three areas - the internal 
organisation of Japanese subsidiaries, the implications for 
spin-off generation, and the development of supplier 
linkages within the indigenous population. The paper is 
inspired by the recent comparative work of Florida and 
Kennedy into organisational factors in technology 
intensive-industry which compares the developmental 
processes undertaken by both American and Japanese 
firms in high technology industry(6). This drew attention 
to the subsequent effects of these differing approaches on 
a number of issues such as, the organisation of 
production, inter-firm and inter-organisational linkages. 
Their work suggests that the Japanese model of 
organisation represents a best-practice system which has 
the greater likelihood of success in the global economy, 
and is the one likely to be diffused and imitated by other 
nations. If this is the case, and the arguments made here 
suggest that the Japanese model is currently being utilised 
within Scottish electronics by several American 
subsidiaries, then does the attraction of Japanese and 
other Far East electronics firms offer another opportunity 
which indigenous industry could benefit from? 
The paper is divided into four sections. The first analyses 
the differences in approach between American and 
Japanese high technology firms. Second, the 
organisational issues for management and workforce are 
discussed. Third, there is an analysis of the likely 
implications for the generation of new start-ups. Finally, 
there is a commentary on the indigenous industry's 
capability to deal with opportunities that come its way 
and circumstances which might assist this process. 
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1. A comparative analysis of US-Japanese high 
technology firms 
The basis of Florida and Kennedy's argument is that the 
structural make-up, organisational patterns, product 
development processes and supplier linkages between 
American and Japanese firms differ, and that the latter 
offers a model of best-practice. The differences are in 
places limited but in specific areas, such as supplier 
linkages and organisation they vary to such an extent that 
it is perhaps worthwhile considering that Japanese firms 
may offer greater opportunities for spin-off generation 
and enhanced local supplier linkages than have hitherto 
been present in the American-dominated Scottish 
electronics industry. Recent evidence suggests that the 
number of spin-off start-ups from American subsidiaries 
operating in Scotland have not reached the hoped for 
levels that "critical mass" proponents of inward 
investment in the early 1980s optimistically espoused.(7) 
Indeed the Strathclyde Institute indicated in 1990 that as 
many as 25,000 jobs could have been created in new 
start-up and enhanced supplier linkages had these 
opportunities been taken. There are several reasons for 
this failure to capitalise on the presence of such a large 
foreign-owned sector in the Scottish electronics industry. 
Many of these are related to the indigenous community 
itself, however, there are also a number of issues related 
to the structure of American electronics subsidiaries 
present in the Scottish economy which hindered 
indigenous growth. These can be linked to what Florida 
and Kennedy term the US model of high technology 
development.(8) 
The US model 
Four factors characterise the American model of 
development in the electronics industry. These are its 
Fordist heritage, the functional specialism which separates 
research and development from manufacturing, the 
framework which failure to fully exploit and 
commercially capitalise on innovations creates for new 
start-up generation, and neglect of manufacturing as a 
source of innovative potential given the correct 
organisational climate. 
The starting point for the US model is recognition of the 
traditional manufacturing styles adopted by American 
business in the early part of this century. This model, 
which emphasises the development of Fordist 
manufacturing principles is manifested in the traditional 
principles of scientific management and the continuous 
flow assembly line. This system, although highly 
profitable throughout most of this century, contains 
weaknesses for a dynamic industry. The specialisation of 
jobs and rigid job classifications, the level of de-skilling 
of the workforce, and the establishment of management 
hierarchies based on functional specialism are not 
acceptable forms of organisation of work in an industry 
which requires to be both global in nature and flexible 
enough to deal with change as an on-going issue. One 
example of this functional specialism which created 
difficulties for the US model is the linkage, or lack of 
linkage between research and development and 
production. 
By separating R&D into specialised centres of excellence, 
the US model of electronics development focused 
attention towards small-scale, high technology 
entrepreneurship, which was characterised by the 
proliferation of small firm generation in the US domestic 
economy. The difficulty with this is that such small firms 
lack global scale capability. The reasons for the large 
number of spin offs in Silicon valley and the Boston 
Route 128 area was the ability of large hi-tech firms to 
generate but not take full commercial advantage of 
innovations. Examples include Digital in the Boston 
Route 128 area which has parented more than thirty 
spin-off companies including Data General, Wang, Prime 
and Apollo.(9) 
The generation of a large number of new start-ups can be 
viewed in a highly positive sense. New firm formation 
strengthens the critical mass arguments for industry 
development. However, it also creates a large number of 
relatively small-scale enterprises which are wide open for 
take-over and lack the scale to become global players. It 
also weakens the market base of larger organisations 
Added to this is the US model's systematic neglect of the 
manufacturing processes linked to success in high 
technology industries and the separation of innovation 
from production sites. Florida and Kennedy cite the 
semiconductor industry as a case in point in which, "The 
neglect of manufacturing recreates the separation of 
innovation from production found in Fordist industry, 
making it extremely difficult to turn new breakthrough 
innovations into a continuous stream of high technology 
products. The end result is that although the US model 
continues to generate important new breakthroughs, it is 
particularly inept at technological follow-through."(10) 
At firm level, there is a recognition that new start ups 
have been operated in a different manner from their 
parent organisations, the large multinational 
semiconductor and computer multinationals. For a start, 
R&D was organised into team-based environments with 
devolved decision making authority and alternative 
organisational and remuneration deals for innovative staff. 
This level of organisational innovation to match product 
innovation has only been achieved on the shop-floor by 
a few companies, such as, Hewlett Packard, Digital, and 
latterly Compaq.(ll) The impact of such decisions are 
apparent when one considers the need for flexibility in 
production terms, improved set-up times, the innovative 
capacity of the workforce, and the need for speed of 
response from a committed workforce. These are all 
factors which are apparent in the Japanese model below. 
From a Scottish perspective the impact is one of limited 
innovative capability within production-dominated 
subsidiary operations. Over time several Scottish 
operations of American Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) 
have displayed limited research and development 
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capability. However, there is also evidence to suggest that 
39 per cent of American subsidiaries maintain their 
branch-plant status. Nevertheless, a sizeable minority 
exhibit the trappings of independent status, such as 
significant R&D operations, marketing functions present 
at plant level or, product and/or process development for 
European and/or world markets.(12) For example, NCR 
and Unisys have world product mandate charters and 
R&D capability whilst IBM and Digital have product 
specific R&D responsibility. The emphasis here is on 
limited nature rather than the acquisition of capability. 
Not enough significant R&D capability is generated at 
subsidiary level because the US model propounded here 
keeps R&D centres separate from manufacturing 
operations. Hence, there is limited potential for spin-off 
generation. There is reason to believe that some of the 
other managerial issues associated with subsidiaries also 
act to discourage spin-offs.(13) 
One example of this is head-hunting. In the United 
States, high technology labour mobility combines with 
sizeable venture capital availability and potential R&D 
spin-off ideas leading to a proliferation of new start-ups. 
In Scotland, the sources of venture capital remain 
restricted and difficult to obtain, and potential spin-off 
ideas are also limited. This leaves a small number of 
highly qualified managers who could act as the start-up 
base working the merry-go-round of computer and 
semiconductor subsidiaries, systematically enhancing their 
personal wealth and authority but adding little to the 
overall advancement of the indigenous sector. The newer 
American entrants have brought with them the penchant 
for innovative forms of remuneration, equity and 
ownership shares which allow managers of Scottish 
subsidiaries to share in the profits. This is intended to act 
as a means of reducing managerial mobility but it does 
not assist the process of new firm formation. Similarly, 
some would argue that the challenges faced in 
subsidiaries may be equally challenging. Jim Manderson, 
Corporate Communications Manager of Digital in Ayr is 
quoted as saying, 'The multinationals have a lot of good 
people but they have found the challenges working within 
the companies. The work is exciting and rewarding. The 
entrepreneurs do not feel the need to get out there." On 
a cynical note, one could perhaps argue that, they lack 
entrepreneurial flair and spirit.(14:15) 
The essence of the US model is characterised by the 
separation of R&D from manufacturing, high degrees of 
industrial fragmentation which limit 'hybrid' innovations 
such as, high definition television, neglect of 
manufacturing processes which leads to the maintenance 
of traditional assembly line techniques when market and 
economic circumstances call out for alternatives, and spot 
market supplier relationships which work on global 
supply chains and hinder local linkages. This may be an 
exaggerated analysis of US manufacturers in the 
electronics industry and several will cry loudly that their 
organisation is different, but the evidence does not bear 
this out There are a few US MNEs present in the 
Scottish economy that do not fit this pattern, however, 
the vast majority do. This is apparent in the lack of local 
input purchases and by persistence with manufacturing 
techniques pioneered by the Ford Motor Company in the 
1920s but hardly relevant to current manufacturing and 
market demands. However, the US model has not been 
transferred wholesale to Scotland. One of its key 
elements are the high levels of new firm formation, a 
feature that has been spectacular by its absence in 
Scotland. 
Other symptoms of the US model are apparent in the 
Scottish electronics industry. One of these is the nature of 
supplier linkages. American firms purchased 77 per cent 
of total inputs to the Scottish electronics industry in 1988, 
the last year for which Scottish Development Agency 
figures are available. Of this, 85 per cent of inputs were 
purchased outside Scotland. The remaining 15 per cent 
included purchases of gas, electricity, and maintenance. 
What appears odd is that the USA itself accounts for only 
9 per cent of sourced inputs. Japanese firms in Scotland 
accounted for 3 per cent of total purchases yet Japan 
itself is the highest source country with 30 per cent of 
total inputs purchased there. Either the small number of 
Japanese firms are buying an awful lot of material from 
home, or, as is the more likely scenario, the American 
contingent has a global supply network which 
incorporates Japan and the Far East. This would confirm 
Florida and Kennedy's contention that American 
electronics firms do not develop long term supply 
linkages but instead are involved, "...in the constant 
breaking and re-forming of supplier relations and (an) 
increasingly general trend of US firms using foreign (eg. 
Japanese) component suppliers and outside contract 
manufacturers located in Asia and the US sunbelt rather 
than local ones."(16) If this is true of the domestic US 
electronics industry then it is equally applicable to 
Scotland. The evidence is also brought out in terms of 
classification. For most American MNEs present in the 
Scottish electronics industry, local supply means Europe. 
To regard purchases of material inputs from a Japanese 
MNE subsidiary in Italy or a fellow American located in 
Germany as being local would be, in comparative terms, 
the equivalent of an American computer manufacturer 
based in Palo Alto, California sourcing components in the 
Boston area. 
In manufacturing techniques, with a few exceptions, 
traditional assembly line operations still persist in US 
electronics firms. This is in stark contrast to the processes 
operated in Japanese electronics firms which lay 
emphasis on partnership with the workforce. Yet we live 
in supposedly enlightened times where firms espouse the 
need to utilise labour as an asset rather than a cost. One 
would be tempted here to argue that firms talk a better 
game than they play. There are exceptions. Digital in Ayr 
and Compaq at Erskine are two American examples 
where the traditional assembly line techniques have been 
replaced by team working conditions which offer greater 
responsibility to the shopfloor worker, and lead to greater 
levels of flexibility and response to changing product 
demand conditions.(17) In this sense these firms are 
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related closer to the Japanese model of manufacturing 
techniques, bom out of the need to fully utilise a fully 
tenured workforce and which led to the elimination of 
elements such as, downtime and waste. In Japan the use 
of self managing teams allowed firms to devolve 
managerial responsibility in areas such as, day-to-day 
operational decisions and supervision, leaving managers 
free to do other things whilst gaining more from 
shopfloor workers. 
The Japanese model 
The model for development of the Japanese electronics 
industry is markedly different from that of the US and 
does appear to offer advantages to the Scottish electronics 
industry. The model, although having a shorter history, 
does indicate a degree of 'fit' to the global economic 
circumstances that surround the electronics industry. This 
is characterised by several features including; alternative 
patterns of workforce organisation, the development of 
integrated relationships with suppliers, attention to the 
innovation/manufacturing link, and a focus on 
internalising spin-offs rather than externalising them via 
the labour market.(18) 
The distinct features of the Japanese model owe a lot to 
the post-war development of Japanese industry. One 
aspect is the early resolution of industrial relations among 
Japanese firms which led to experiments with alternatives 
systems to the Fordist/Taylorised process of traditional 
assembly line techniques. The guarantee of core 
employee status for the workforce meant tenure of 
employment. This created a re-think of the role of the 
shopfloor worker as a fixed cost which could be utilised 
more as an asset. One aspect of the re-think was to 
devolve managerial responsibilities to shopfloor workers. 
It also meant that Japanese management could introduce 
new technology with little workforce resistance because 
tenure placed pressure on utilising labour in other ways. 
In contrast to the US model where innovations were 
externalised, Japanese managers were under pressure to 
develop new products to absorb labour thus creating an 
internal pressure for innovation. As Florida and Kennedy 
note, "The end result was a powerful new model of 
production organisation designed to harness the 
knowledge as well as physical labour output of shopfloor 
workers....at filling in the pores of the working day by 
tapping the full and complete capabilities of their 
workers."(19) 
One organisational mechanism that has been used 
effectively to achieve this greater utilisation has been the 
development of the self-managing team. These have been 
used in devolving responsibility, socialising the 
production process, generating self-induced discipline 
amongst the workforce, and harnessing the inherent 
problem-solving capabilities of shopfloor staff. It is not 
clear, however, whether these improvements were a 
self-conscious attempt at generating improved shopfloor 
presence or were simply a result of cultural processes 
being used to reach traditional Japanese-style consensus 
decision making. However, several American MNEs 
during the mid 1980s recognised these advantages and 
have moved to exploit them to the same extent as the 
Japanese. These firms remain the exceptions rather than 
the rule.(20) 
A third feature of the Japanese model is the use of 
integrated relationships between Japanese electronics 
manufacturers and their suppliers. This has its most 
obvious public showing in the development of the 
'Just-in-Time' (JTT) buyer/supplier linkage which has 
been a feature of Japanese industrial organisation that 
many American and Western European firms have tried 
to copy with varying degrees of success (or lack of) since 
the late 1980s. 
The use of integrated linkages between buyers and 
suppliers rests more with the organisational framework 
which underpins JTT than with the physical embodiment 
of the process itself. This framework is characterised 
within the Japanese model by four elements. First, 
co-location and agglomeration create necessary size to 
make the relationships effective. Second, tiered 
production networks link the right manufacturing element 
to supply group. Third, communication and interaction 
are achieved via shared management and engineering 
personnel. This establishes within the relationship 
collective problem-solving responsibility. Fourth, shared 
responsibility and integrated relationships foster 
collaborative research and development. Finally, shared 
ownership is often apparent in these relationships. These 
are features of one element of the Japanese model that 
are difficult to copy in the west due to the amount of 
time they take to develop, and the amount of trust that is 
needed to engender them. Arm's length supplier linkages 
do not foster integrated relationships. 
Japanese electronics MNEs use the JIT linkage 
relationship to establish complexes of smaller suppliers. 
For example, 70 per cent of NEC and Epson parts are 
made by outside suppliers shifting the cost basis to those 
suppliers rather than the MNE.(21) However, the supply 
relationship is there to be taken advantage of by 
subcontracting firms in terms of improving their own 
performance standards. This is something that Scottish 
suppliers have been criticised for in the past. 
Another feature of the Japanese model is the generation 
of internal, sponsored, spin-off companies, backed by the 
MNE and developed in-house until sufficient size and 
capability have been developed. This is also an effective 
form of reducing management hierarchies, a current 
management vogue, by outplacing senior executives. 
The final feature of the Japanese model is the emphasis 
placed upon the R&D/manufacturing linkage. In this, the 
Japanese model copies the US one in the use of 
team-based R&D development procedures. However, the 
Japanese model lengthens the time the team operates 
together and extends to include and incorporate the 
manufacturing element. This establishes a level of 
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functional integration with teams developing out of 
research and development projects and continuing in 
existence through to the point of shopfloor assembly of 
the product 
2. Organisational issues for management and 
workforce in the Scottish electronics industry 
In an earlier paper for this commentary it was pointed out 
that the Japanese model was well known to American 
counterparts in the electronics industry.(22) One element 
of having this knowledge available was the need to find 
degrees of fit between what was appropriate for Japanese 
firms in their own environment and what could prove 
applicable to a Western European setting such as, 
Scotland. The emphasis placed on issues such as, the 
exploitation of human resources requires to be tailored 
(sic) to the environment, "American recognition that to 
compete effectively on global markets against competitors 
such as, Japan, does not mean adopting Japanese 
management techniques per se. What firms such as, 
Digital et al do regard as important is the recognition that 
human resource development can address technological 
and strategic problems."(23) 
The comparison of the US and Japanese models also 
brings to light the need for change amongst the operating 
subsidiaries of American MNEs present in Scotland as 
well as the opportunities that may arise from the presence 
of the Japanese MNE contingent. The analysis here is 
divided into two areas - management issues associated 
with internal and external organisation, and workforce 
issues associated with work design and degrees of 
manufacturing responsibility. Florida and Kennedy argue 
in their article that the Japanese model is best suited to 
the electronics industry and that, "Over time, this is likely 
to imply a gradual shift in the centre of gravity of 
economic and technological power toward Japan and 
increasing imitation and diffusion of the Japanese model 
by other firms and nations."(24) If this is the case, then 
the Scottish electronics industry needs to be aware of the 
likely implications of such a shift. To the extent that 
inward investment is targeted more towards the Far East, 
there is overt recognition already. However, there is also 
a need to look at the likely impact on organisational 
issues within firms based in the Silicon Glen area. 
In terms of internal, managerial issues, the ability to 
devolve power to the shopfloor becomes crucial. To 
ensure manufacturing effectiveness over time, and to 
eradicate the inherent immobility created by high levels 
of continuous flow assembly via fully automated lines, 
the organisation of work in the electronics industry will 
be divided into self-managing teams where the workforce 
achieve responsibility for determining and meeting 
production schedules. This leaves the manager in such an 
environment with spare time on his hands. To take 
advantage of this managers will become more involved 
in planning issues such as, external vendor management. 
One implication of this is that the days of the functional 
specialist in management are numbered. This will also be 
confirmed by the adoption of the team approach from 
R&D through to manufacture. 
There are also management implications in terms of the 
external environment for supplier firms. If, as appears 
likely, the Japanese model is the one that is accepted as 
the industry norm, then the generation of more integrated 
supplier linkages will mean more permanent 
buyer/supplier relationships. The difficulty with this is 
that the Scottish electronics industry is not geared up for 
such linkages. It never was, and may never be, able to 
cope with such relationships. The single market may not 
assist this process. Physical proximity is only an 
advantage where suppliers can compete effectively with 
other firms, or where bulk items such as, metal 
fabrication are concerned. Individual American MNEs 
present in the Scottish economy have made serious 
attempts at developing high quality supplier networks but 
the overall picture is still a gloomy one. The major 
electronics companies spend around £3 billion on bought 
in components and subcontract work. At most, Scottish 
firms receive 15 per cent of this business. There is still a 
lot of work to be done in supplier development 
Further opportunities will present themselves via Japanese 
electronics firms. Examples are already apparent with the 
arrival in the UK of other Japanese MNEs. For example, 
Toyota's engine plant on Deeside will by 1995 have local 
supply content running at 80 per cent, half of which will 
be supplied by UK firms who have made it onto the 400 
strong short-list of suppliers along with firms from 
Germany, France, Spain and Italy.(25) This, by far, 
exceeds the 30 per cent local content cited by many 
American electronics firms which includes all of Europe 
as local (even though the overall figures do not bear this 
out). Clearly, opportunities exist for the development of 
long-term supply linkages with Japanese MNEs in the 
electronics industry. It may be time that these 
opportunities were actively exploited. 
The internal workforce issues have been hinted at above. 
The environment for manufacturing workers will improve 
remarkably with the adoption of alternatives to the 
assembly line techniques characteristic of Taylorised 
firms. For example, the emphasis on training in teamwork 
and cooperation is essential to the consensus management 
style of Japanese business. Work groups are one of the 
fundamental units of any large Japanese company and job 
responsibilities and duties are shared between all 
members of the group, and cooperation is a must if it is 
to run smoothly. Therefore, we can expect to see more 
adoption of changing forms of work organisation in 
American manufacturing plants based in Scotland as they 
struggle to compete effectively against the greater 
flexibility of Japanese rivals. 
3. Implications for the generation of start-ups 
Perhaps the most difficult area to analyse in relation to 
the comparative model of US/Japanese organisation 
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within the electronics industry is the impact on the 
number of start-ups and their progression. Neither the US 
model, which in its domestic economy spawns a plethora 
of start-ups but in Scotland apparently hinders them, or, 
the Japanese model of internally-generated and nurtured 
new firms, offers any comfort for the development of 
indigenous enterprise. 
New firm formation is a sign of a healthy and dynamic 
economy. However, Scotland is characterised by low 
company start up rates, few business failures, and limited 
business success. Scotland has few, if any, high flying 
indigenous start-ups of the likes of Compaq in the United 
States. These types of firms are a necessity in economic 
development of the economy. The problem is again one 
related to the entrepreneurial climate for start-ups and 
their founders. Recent evidence suggests that there are 
five ways to improve the start-up situation in Scotland: 
1. Establish technology 'incubators' to build up 
ideas emanating from universities and colleges 
which need support and advice; 
2. Government support for venture capitalists; 
3. Inward investment projects with integrated 
R&D content; 
4. Attraction of expatriate scots currently 
employed in the electronics industry in 
America; 
5. Improved commercial links between 
universities and industry.(26) 
These suggestions work largely on the assumption that 
technology-generated start-ups have successfully 
emanated from the university sector. However, if there is 
one thing which has characterised Scottish electronics 
over the last twenty years, it has been the wholesale 
failure of university-generated new technology firms to 
make any impact on the domestic or international 
electronics scene. One would not deny that the level of 
electronics research undertaken at Scottish universities is 
of a very high standard, what is missing is the 
development element. 
The successful indigenous firms in electronics have come 
from outwith Scottish academia and what is required here 
is the generation of new start-up ideas from the existing 
foreign-owned base, or that of the newly arrived 
foreign-owned base of Japanese MNEs. There appears to 
be a logical argument here. What prevented subsidiary 
spin-offs in the past was the branch plant status of these 
operations and an inherent lack of entrepreneurialism. 
However, this is being eradicated and if the research 
evidence is true, more American MNE subsidiaries have 
a higher level of R&D and marketing capability which is 
the basis for new firm formation. However, this has not 
been accomplished as yet, and is perhaps in need of a 
push. Within Scottish Enterprise the emphasis is wrong. 
Rauier than drawing attention to the significant base of 
activity in Scottish academia, there should be 
encouragement of spin-offs from those foreign 
subsidiaries which currently boast significant capabilities 
in R&D and marketing. 
Depending on the level and speed of development of the 
Japanese and Far East presence, there may be similar 
experiences to those of US firms currently present in the 
Scottish electronics industry. There will be a confidence 
phase that firms will go through in terms of supplier 
contracts and developing indigenous management 
However, if the Japanese model is to be believed there 
may be an opportunity to develop sponsored spin-offs 
which do not necessarily have to be Japanese in origin. 
Whereas American electronics subsidiaries have actively 
discouraged management start-ups (either overtly by 
making internal management projects too attractive to 
leave the subsidiary, or, covertly by discouraging 
parent/start-up linkages), there are opportunities that the 
Japanese model may offer. Granted these potential 
start-ups will be parent financed and will retain sizeable 
parent ownership, but they offer the potential of 
maintaining a permanent relationship with the Japanese 
subsidiary. This is something that has not happened with 
American subsidiaries in Scotland and therefore perhaps 
the Japanisation of Scottish electronics is no bad thing. 
4 Strengthening our weaknesses to take 
advantage of opportunities 
One element which could assist this process of new firm 
formation would be some form of strategy at a macro 
level. None currently exists that one could openly point 
to as being either effective or well publicised. There is a 
need here for a combination of associated organizations 
to come together and actively foster new firm generation. 
From the perspective of government, more needs to be 
done in relation to the encouragement of managers from 
subsidiaries to take start-up ideas forward. This may even 
mean a shift in emphasis. As Jim Manderson of Digital 
notes, 'The advantages offered to incoming companies 
are more than would be offered to people setting up their 
own businesses. I do not think there is enough 
inducement." Similarly, MacPhcrson notes, "If Silicon 
glen is to have a lasting benefit, it's essential to devote 
as much resource to indigenous industry as is spent on 
attracting overseas companies."(27) Some possible steps 
along the way may assist the development of electronics 
industry in Scotland. 
Step one involves equalising the inducements for 
start-ups at home compared to investment from abroad. 
If there are limited opportunities for new firm formation 
from either American or Japanese subsidiaries in Scotland 
these need to be encouraged both in financial and 
practical terms. One method of doing so would be for 
Scottish Enterprise to actively fund company 
development and new venture establishments. Yet the 
Quarterly Economic Commentary Volume 17, No. 1, 1991 
slashing of budgets within Scottish Enterprise has already 
led to severe reductions in the amount of monies 
allocated to such programmes. 
Step two is linked to trying to get the foreign sector to 
play ball and encourage new firm formation from within 
their own ranks. The job of the inward investment agency 
should not end on the public announcement of a new 
arrival. Both government agencies and subsidiary 
operations themselves need to actively encourage the 
departure of managers from these subsidiaries to form 
start-ups. It is about time that the plant managers of 
subsidiary operations began actively encouraging their 
managers to leave the nest and set up in business for 
themselves. The age-old complaint that there are no 
indigenous suppliers of merit is a double-edged sword 
because potential new suppliers are not given any 
incentive to become entrepreneurial. Similarly, work 
needs to be done on encouraging managers with ideas 
within subsidiaries to take the 'leap* into firm formation. 
Although a number of American electronics subsidiaries 
are experiencing the recession currendy, the timing may 
be right. Potential market downturn may be viewed in 
this sense as more of an opportunity than a threat, if seen 
in the correct light as providing the impetus for managers 
within recession-hit subsidiaries to move onto new 
pastures in the form of business start-ups. This is where 
a strong link between Scottish Enterprise's Industry 
Division and the American original equipment 
manufacturers' (OEMs) subsidiaries based in Scotland 
could foster firm formation. Yet this division has had to 
undergo budget cutbacks in 1991/2 of around 45 per cent 
between probable and actual budget spends. This means 
that some elements of economic development have had 
to be severely restricted or in some instances have had to 
go. The most serious of these in relation to firm 
development are areas such as, developing new ventures 
and liaison with OEMs. 
Steps three and four involve some form of investment. 
By establishing some form of 'incubation centre' as 
mentioned earlier some of the classical start-up errors 
could be avoided - step three. This could be done in 
accordance with current thinking which emphasises the 
training element of economic development, and was one 
of the reasons for the formation of Scottish Enterprise. 
Would it not be a sign of the sincerity of such an 
organisation to found a centre with the sole prerogative 
of generating new indigenous start-ups from the current 
foreign-owned base? There are precedents for this which 
indicate that this route can be successfully exploited. The 
Institute of Polymer Processing Technology is an 
example where Scottish Enterprise funds development 
An Institute of Supplier Development or New Firm 
Formation might be just the sort of venturing that meets 
both foreign-owned firms' supply needs and establishes 
new start-ups in the Scottish electronics industry. The 
supplier development programme within Scottish 
Enterprise has been one of the few which has maintained 
most of its budget spend. 
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Although the funding of an incubator centre may be 
minute by comparison to the budget of 'Locate in 
Scotland' or the Scottish Business Centre in London, the 
availability of adequate levels of venture capital is 
another matter. Perhaps LIS should be targeted with the 
objective of attracting higher levels of venture capital 
investment from abroad, from Europe, the United States, 
or Japan. If, as appears to be the case we cannot or, will 
not, provide adequate levels of finance on our own, then 
maybe others are willing to take the risk. 
Conclusion 
This paper has looked at the US versus Japanese model 
of development of the electronics industry and has 
isolated the closer linkage between research and 
development and production, integrated long-term supply 
relationships, and more effective forms of work 
organisation within manufacturing as factors which make 
the Japanese model more likely to be effective in the 
long term. This threatens the presence of American firms 
who do not follow the model, or persist in some of the 
techniques characterising the previous success of the US 
model. 
It has also looked at the implications of these models for 
the Scottish electronics industry in terms of managerial 
issues, supplier linkages, work organisation practices and 
the generation of indigenous start-up firms emanating 
from the foreign sector. It concludes that there is a 
greater likelihood of success in terms of firm formation 
and stronger linkages via the Japanese model than have 
been apparent from experience with the American 
presence in electronics in Scotland. However, a number 
of steps could be undertaken to actively assist this 
process. 
Something has to be done. There are a number of threats 
and opportunities currently facing the Scottish electronics 
industry. The single market may shift emphasis away 
from peripheral to core regions, the opening up of 
Eastern Europe will certainly challenge the low cost 
status of Scotland as an electronics manufacturing centre. 
We constantly bemoan the indigenous sector's inability 
to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the 
growth of the foreign-owned sector. The situation calls 
out for some form of action. There are opportunities 
presented by the presence of Japanese subsidiaries and 
the inclination towards the Japanese model pointed out 
earlier. Whether these are realistic opportunities that will 
present themselves in the form of quasi-indigenous 
start-ups is as yet unknown. However, it may be 
worthwhile taking action ourselves to actively encourage 
start-ups from within the current foreign base where these 
present themselves. They have first to be identified, they 
have then to be committed to (by all interested parties), 
and then acted on. The loss of 25,000 jobs whether a 
realistic figure or only partly correct is a missed 
opportunity. These opportunities do not present 
themselves as often as we would like. Therefore, it is 
worthwhile considering the prospects for the future and 
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taking some action to try an encourage the growth of 
indigenous start-ups from the foreign firm base in 
electronics. 
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